University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Edward H. Levi Speeches

Faculty Scholarship

3-29-1976

Statement of the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of
the United States before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. 10:00 AM.
Monday, March 29, 1976. Dirksen Senate Office Building.
Washington, D.C.
Edward H. Levi
EdwardHirsch.Levi@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech

Recommended Citation
Levi, Edward H., "Statement of the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of the United States before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. 10:00 AM. Monday,
March 29, 1976. Dirksen Senate Office Building. Washington, D.C." (1976). Edward H. Levi Speeches. 34.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech/34

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Edward H. Levi Speeches by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

~rpnrfmtnf ll~ ~ustit£

STATEMENT
OF
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES

10:00 A.M.
MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1976
DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to appear here today to testify in
support of S. 3197, a bill which authorizes applications
for a court order approving the use of electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information.
On February 18, 1976, in a Message to the Congress
on the activities of our intelligence agencies, the President
stated that the Administration would work with the
appropriate leaders of Congress to develop legislation to
deal with a critical problem involving personal privacy-electronic surveillance.

We have met and worked with a

number of Congressional leaders, including members of this
Subcommittee, and the discussions have been marked by a
bipartisan spirit of cooperation.

The legislative proposal

is the product of this effort, and I appreciate the support
and advice of those who have worked with us on it.
I believe that this bill is significant not only in
the way it has been developed but in the safeguards it
establishes to protect individual rights.

Enactment of this

bill will provide major assurance to the public that electronic
surveillance will be used in the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes pursuant to legislative standards and
under procedures requiring accountability for official action,
scrutiny of the action by Executive officials at regular
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intervals, and the independent review, as provided, by a
detached and neutral magistrate.
Before discussing some of the more important provisions
of the bill in any detail, I believe it would be helpful at
this point to give an overview of the bill.
S. 3197 provides for the designation by the Chief
Justice of seven district court judges, to whom the Attorney
General, if he is authorized by the President to do so,
may make application for an order approving electronic
surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence
purposes.

The judge may grant such an order only if he finds

that there is probable cause to believe that the target of
the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power and if a Presidential appointee confirmed by the
Senate has certified that the information sought is indeed
foreign intelligence information that cannot feasibly be
obtained by less intrusive techniques.

Such surveillances

may not continue longer than 90 days without securing
renewed approval from the court.

There is an emergency

provision in the bill which is available in situations in
which there is no possibility of preparing the necessary
papers for the court's review in time to obtain the
information sought in the surveillance.

In such circum-

stances the Attorney General may authorize the use of
electronic surveillance for a period of no more than 24
hours.

The Attorney General would be required to notify a

judge at the time of the authorization that such a

-
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decision has been made and to submit an application to
the judge within 24 hours.

Finally, the Attorney General

must report annually both to the Congress and the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts statistics
on electronic surveillance pursuant to the bill's procedures.
The standards and procedures that the proposed bill
establishes are not a response to any presumed constitutional
requirement of a judicial warrant as a condition of the
legality of a surveillance undertaken for foreign intelligence
purposes.

Such a requirement has not been the holding of

the courts, which in general have either found the employment
of electrenic surveillance without a warrant in the foreign
intelligence area to be lawful, as in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Brown and the Third Circuit's decision in
Butenko, or have left the decision open, as in Keith.

The

Zweibon decision of the District of Columbia Circuit has
broad dicta among its several opinions but its holding in
fact was quite limited and consistent with Butenko and Brown.
The proposed bill's standards and procedures respond,
then, not to a constitutional warrant requirement, but to
considerations of public policy.

It is founded on the

necessity that the branches of Government work together
to overcome the fragmentation of the present law among
the areas of legislation, judicial decisions, and administrative action, and to achieve the coherence, stability and
clarity in the law and practice that alone can

a~sure

necessary

protection of the Nation's safety and of individual rights.

-
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Of course, constitutional considerations have been
paramount in shaping the present law in this area.

I

have described the evolution of this law and my understanding of its present shape in my testimony, last
November 6, before the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities.

Since the length of my testimony has been

the subject of some comment, I will not repeat it, or
even summarize it, here, except to emphasize a central
point.

The law of the Fourth Amendment's requirements

has changed over time; the Amendment's general reasonableness
standard does not have a fixed content, but depends on a
perception of the degree of invasion of individual privacy,
the nature and degree of the Governmental interest served,
and the barriers that can be raised against the
possibilities of abuse.
In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
held for the first time that the electronic monitoring of
conversations, without physical intrusion, invaded privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and required,
in the circumstances there, prior judicial approval.

The

Court, however, expressly reserved the question whether warraJ
were required for similar intrusions undertaken for foreign
intelligence purposes.

In part in response to the Katz

ruling, Congress in 1968 enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, Title III of which establishes careful
and strict procedures for judicial approval of electronic

5~n
surveillances.

Title III incorporates, as a requisite to

such approval, the standard of probable cause to believe
that crime has been committed; it includes notice and other
requirements appropriate to surveillances undertaken for law
enforcement purposes.

But echoing the reservation in

Katz, and in recognition of the great responsibilities of the
President in the areas of foreign relations and protection
of the Nation's safety from foreign threats, Congress
included in Title III a proviso to the effect that the Act
does not limit the constitutional power of the President
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against
foreign intelligence activities.

Then in a separate

sentence the proviso goes on to say:

"Nor shall anything

contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against
the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful
means.

"

In 1972, in the Keith case, the Supreme Court addressed
the Fourth Amendment's application to the exercise of the
President's constitutional power referred to the part of
Title Ill's proviso I have just quoted, concerning protection

-
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against domestic security threats.

In speaking of the

proviso a~ a whole--the parts relating to foreign as well
as to domestic threats--the Court stated:

"Congress

simply left presidential power where it found them."

The

Court went on to hold that in the field of internal
~l'~'\lri

t·:",

if tht're is no foreign involvement,

a judicial
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Under the dominant case law, electronic surveillance
without a judicial warrant, conducted for foreign intelligence
purposes essential to the national security and relating
to foreign powers and the agents of foreign powers, is
lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

This is the shape of

the present law, but the legality of an activity does
not remove. from the Executive or from Congress the
responsibility to take steps, within their power, to seek
an accommodation between the vital public and private
interests involved.
Since at least May of 1940 the Government has, under
express authorization of the President, employed electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence or national security

-
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purposes.

Under the authorization of the President, the

Department of Justice has adopted strict standards and
procedures to govern such surveillances, to ensure their
conformity to the law and their reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment, and to minimize to the extent practical
their intrusion on individual interests.

Attorney General

Richardson stated the standards employed in a letter to
Senator Fulbright dated September 12, 1973.

I have

reiterated, moreover, that electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes is authorized only when
the subject is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power,
and in this latter case the agency must be one that relates
to activities of concern to the United States for foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence reasons.

I have said

in the past, and I can say again today, that no such
electronic surveillance without a warrant is at present
directed against any American citizen.
I believe the time has come when Congress and the
Executive togetper can take much needed steps to give
clarity and coherence to a great part of the law in this
area,

the part of the law that concerns domestic electronic

surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.

To bring

greater coherence to this field, one must, of course,
build on the thoughts and experiences of the past, to give

r

-

ti

-

reasonable recognition, as the judicial decisions in
general have done, to the confidentiality, judgments and
discretion that the President's constitutional responsibilities
require, to give legislative form to the standards and
procedures that experience suggests, and to provide added
assurance by adapting a judicial warrant procedure to the
unique characteristics of this area.

The statements of

thoughtful judges have suggested, and encouraged, the
belief that adaptation is possible,

that it is possible to

achieve an accommodation that allows obtaining information
necessary to the safety of the Republic and protects
individual rights.

As Justice Powell said in Keith:

"Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information
and the protected rights of our citizens.

For the warrant

application may vary according to the governmental interest
to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving
protection."

542
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The definitions in the bill limit and direct the scope
of national security electronic surveillance in the united States
to surveillances directed at the agents of foreign powers for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information.

The

key questions, then, are what is meant by electronic surveillance,
foreign intelligence information, foreign powers, and agents of
a foreign power.
It is the definition of electronic surveillance which
restricts the scope of the bill to interceptions within the
United States.

In brief, S. 3197 authorizes the use of

electronic surveillance to intercept any communication between
persons in the United States.
definition.

There are three elements to the

First, the bill covers all wiretaps within the

United States of telephone or telegram communications regardless
of the location of the sender or receiver.

Second, all radio

transmissions, such as long distance telephone calls carried by
microwave, between points within the United States, are covered.
Finally, the bill would establish a procedure for seeking a
judicial warrant authorizing the use of an electronic, mechanical,
or other device, such as a microphone, to acquire information
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Because of the different nature of government

operations to collect foreign intelligence by intercepting
international

com~unications

-- a process described as the

interception of signals and the processing of those signals by
techniques which sort and analyze the signals to reject those

- 10 that are inappropriate or unnecessary -- that use of electronic
surveillance is not addressed in this bill.
Foreign intelligence information is defined as:

first,

information relating to the ability of the United States to
protect itself from actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power; or second, information with respect to
foreign powers or territories which because of its importance is
deemed essential to the security or national defense of the
Nation or to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States; or third, information relating to the ability of the
united States to protect the national security against foreign
intelligence activities.
Foreign power is defined in the bill as including,
in addition to foreign governments, foreign "factions, parties,
I

I

military forces, or agencies or instrumentalities of such
entities, or organizations composed of such entities, whether or

I

l

not recognized by the United States, or foreign based terrorist
groups."
Under the bill a Federal judge would not be

authoriz~

to issue a warrant unless he finds that there is probable cause
to believe the subject of the surveillance is the agent of a
foreign power.

The definition of "agent of a foreign power" is,

therefore, central to the protection afforded by the bill.

A

person is considered an agent of a foreign power if he fits
within either of two categories:

first, that he is an officer 0:

employee of a foreign power but is not a permanent resident
alien or citizen of the United States; or second, that pursuant

- 11 -
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to the direction of a foreign power, he is "engaged in clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, or terrorist activities,
or .

[he] conspires with, assists or aids and abets such a

person in engaging in such activities."
As I wrote to Senator Kennedy before he introduced this
bill, "In my view, the present bill is correct in placing its
principal focus not solely upon the factor of Federal criminality,
but upon the issue of whether the proposed target of the surveillance is engaging in clandestine intelligence activities,
sabotage or terrorism as an agent of a foreign power and pursuant
to the foreign powers direction."
This is because some clandestine intelligence activities
of foreign powers or their agents may not violate Federal
criminal statutes and yet be of great importance.
The bill would authorize a warrant only upon a finding
by a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to believe
the subject of the surveillance is, indeed, a foreign agent as
defined.

I am sure this kind of procedure, taken as a whole,

with its emphasis on foreign agency for the purpose of engaging
in clandestine intelligence, sabotage or terrorist activities
satisfies not only the requirements of the Fourth Amendment but
also the requirements of sound public policy and the need for
public reassurance.
Turning now from the definitions to some of the
substantive provisions, the bill requires that minimization
procedures be followed to limit as much as possible the

- 12 acquisition and retention of information relating to permanent
resident aliens or citizens of the United States that is not
foreign intelligence information.

I would expect these procedure!

to differ from case to case depending upon the type of informatio:
sought and the nature of the target of the electronic surveillance
When it is impossible to completely prevent the acquisition

~

information that is not foreign intelligence-related, the bill
provides for the minimization of retention of such information.
The bill does not provide for notice to be given to
the subjects of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence electronic surveillance except in the instance of
an emergency authorization under procedures I have discussed.
Under that emergency provision the Attorney General is allowed
to authorize surveillances for 24 hours subject to the later
approval of a judge.

A judge has the discretion to order notice

to the subject of a surveillance if he declines to ratify the
emergency surveillance.
Finally, I come to section 2528 which relates to the
constitutional power of the President to order electronic surveillance under facts and circumstances not covered by this
legislation.
As I have indicated, I think this bill can be a step
toward coordinating the executive, legislative and administrative law and practice in a significant part of this area.

But

as I have also pointed out, the bill is by its definition
limited to the interception within the United States by electronic surveillance, as defined, of foreign intelligence

- 13 information.

The bill does not purport to cover interceptions,

other than by use within the United States of devices such as
wiretaps and microphones, of international communications.
Therefore the provision with respect to Presidential power is
directed specifically towards electronic surveillances when the
facts and circumstances are beyond the scope of this bill.
In my letter to Senator Kennedy on this bill, I stated
that "this provision would represent the expression of congressional and presidential intent that the President use the
procedures established by the bill for all national security
surveillance which falls within the scope of this legislation.
At the same time, it would assure that every situation important
to the national interest would be covered -- either by the warrant
procedure of the bill or by the President's inherent constitutional power, however that power may be defined by the courts,
to conduct electronic surveillance with respect to foreign
powers.

I reaffirm, however, . • . that it will be the policy

and intent of the Department of Justice, if this bill is enacted,
to proceed exclusively pursuant to judicial warrant with respect
to all electronic surveillance against domestic communications
of American citizens or permanent resident aliens."
Section 2528 of the bill and its reference to
Section 2511 (3) of Title III must, of course, be read in the
light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Keith case.

First,

by the section, as Justice Powell wrote of Section 2511(3),
Title III, "Congress simply left Presidential powers where it

- 14 found them."

Second, Justice Powell wrote that there is no

inherent Presidential power to conduct electronic surveillance
without a warrant directed against "a group or organization
composed of citizens of the United States and which has no
significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or
agencies."

To state what

is obvious, section 2528 of the bill

does not affect the constitutional condemnation of warrantless
electronic surveillances of the sort involved in the Keith and
zweibon cases.
In conclusion, I want to say that it is my view that
this bill is a significant, even an historic step.

I believe

,
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it is important to the country, and I hope it will be enacted

I
I

quickly.
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